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RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: 
HIGHWAYS, DEMONSTRATIONS AND THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Jones and another [1999] 2 All E.R. 257 
(H.L.) (Lords Irvine LC, Slynn, Hope, Clyde and Hutton) 
It has been said that in English law "cars and horses have more legal rights than people".1 
Traditionally precedence has been accorded to the right to travel on the highway at the expense 
of any right to assemble peaceably and non-obstructively upon it. This has been in contrast to 
other jurisdictions in which it has been accepted that if the right of peaceful assembly and 
protest is to mean anything at all there must be secured to the public some space in which they 
can exercise it.2 No such position has, until now, been adopted in the UK. Indeed the very exis-
tence of any right of assembly, in the absence of a Bill of Rights, has been in doubt.3 
On 4* March 1999 the House of Lords, in a case which the Lord Chancellor said raised an 
issue of fundamental constitutional importance, held that the public do, after all, have a right 
to assemble on the highway as long as their use of it is reasonable and is consistent with the 
public's primary right of passage. 
THE FACTS 
The events in question took place on 1 June 1995 on the grass verge by the side of the A344 
adjacent to the perimeter fence of Stonehenge. A group had gathered there to protest about the 
lack of public access to the monument on the tenth anniversary of the "Battle of the Beanfield", 
a violent clash between "new age travellers" and the police. It was found as a matter of fact by 
the Crown Court (and accepted for the purposes of subsequent appeals) that the appellants and 
their group were behaving peacefully and were not obstructing the highway. 
A police inspector present on the scene counted 21 people and concluded that they consti-
tuted a "trespassory assembly" under the Public Order Act 1986.4 He informed them of this 
and asked them to leave. Many did so but some, including the appellants, Dr. Jones and Mr 
Lloyd, refused. They were then arrested for taking part in a trespassory assembly.5 
THE OFFENCE OF TRESPASSORY ASSEMBLY 
The offence of trespassory assembly was created by section 70 of the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994 which inserted section 14A into the Public Order Act 1986. It provides 
that the chief officer of police can apply to the local council for a banning order if he reason-
ably believes that an assembly is likely to be trespassory and may result in serious disruption 
to the life of the community or damage to historical or other important buildings or monu-
ments.6 The order can last for four days and can only operate within a radius of up to five miles 
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of a specified point.7 A n assembly is trespassory, and thus section 14A order operates to ban 
it, if it is held on land to which the public has "no or only a limited right of access" and takes 
place "without the permission of the occupier...or so as to exceed the limits of the permis-
sion...or of the public's right of access".8 Section 14A(9) states that "limited" means that the 
use of the land is restricted to use for a "particular purpose". 
In this case a section 14A order was in place. It covered the part of the A344 upon which the 
appellants were assembled. The central question then was, in holding a peaceful and non-
obstructive demonstration on the highway, were the appellants exceeding their limited right to 
be there? The primary purpose of the highway is passage and repassage, but how far did the 
public's right extend beyond this? Did it only include activities merely "incidental or ancil-
lary" to this primary purpose or did it include such activities as the holding of assemblies, that 
have nothing to do with the right of passage? 
The appellants were convicted by the Justices but their conviction was overturned on appeal 
to the Crown Court because their demonstration was not obstructive or violent and was a reason-
able use of the highway. 
The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed by way of case stated to the Divisional Court 
which overturned the Crown Court's decision.9 McCowan L.J . stated that the issue of reason-
ableness did not arise and the Crown Court's implication that any assembly on the highway is 
lawful as long as it is peaceful and non-obstructive was "mistaken", for "it [left] out of the 
account the existence of the [s. 14 A order] and its operation...which occurs to restrict the limited 
right of access to the highway by the public".10 Collins J. agreed, stating that "[t]he holding of 
a meeting, a demonstration or a vigil on the highway, however peaceable...may...be tolerated 
but there is no legal right to pursue [such activities]".11 
T H E DECISION OF T H E HOUSE OF LORDS 
The House of Lords, by a majority of three to two (Lord Slynn and Lord Hope dissenting) over-
turned the decision of the Divisional Court and allowed the appeal of the protesters. A peaceful, 
non-obstructive assembly could (and in this case did) come within the limits of the public's 
right of access to the highway. In reaching this decision the Law Lords reviewed and relied on 
several late nineteenth and early twentieth century cases which consider the nature and extent 
of the public's right of access to the highway.12 The majority interpreted these authorities widely 
and relied on the most liberal constructions of the law within them.13 
Lord Irvine went the furthest, stating that the public highway was a place which the public 
might enjoy for any reasonable purpose, provided the activity did not amount to a public or 
private nuisance and did not obstruct the highway by unreasonably impeding the primary 
right of the public to pass and repass. Subject to these qualifications there was "a public right 
of peaceful assembly on the highway".14 Any fears that the rights of private landowners 
might be prejudiced and that this test would allow carte blanche to "squatters and other unin-
vited visitors" were unfounded, for the law of trespass would continue to protect private 
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landowners against "unreasonably large, unreasonably prolonged or unreasonably obstructive 
assemblies".15 
Lords Clyde and Hutton, accepted that what is a "reasonable or usual [mode of using the 
highway] may develop and change from one period of history to another".16 Critically they also 
held that the common law does now recognise a right of public assembly and that in some 
circumstances this right could be exercised on the highway, as indeed was the case here.17 
They were more cautious than the Lord Chancellor however and fell short of issuing general 
guidance. They stressed that every case must depend on its own facts. Lord Clyde said that the 
appellants and the Crown Court had gone further than was necessary in suggesting that any 
reasonable use of the highway, as long as it was peaceful and non-obstructive was lawful, and 
so a matter of public right. This approach would open a "door of uncertain dimensions into an 
ill-defined area of uses which might erode the basic predominance of the essential use of a 
highway as a highway". A test could not be defined in general terms but must depend upon the 
particular circumstances of each case.18 
Further support for the majority decision was derived from the argument that it was desir-
able that there be harmony between the law of trespass and the law relating to wilful obstruction 
of the highway. Section 137 of the Highways Act 1980 makes it an offence to wilfully obstruct 
the highway without lawful authority or excuse. In Hirst v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire 
it was held that the question of whether the highway was being obstructed without lawful excuse 
must be "answered by deciding whether the activity in which the defendant was engaged was 
or was not a reasonable user of the highway".19 In the present case Lord Irvine stated it to be 
"satisfactory that there is a symmetry in the law between the activities on the public highway 
which may be trespassory and those which may amount to unlawful obstruction of the high-
way".20 It was therefore appropriate that the test of reasonableness should be applied to both, 
a view with which Lord Hutton agreed.21 
In their dissenting judgements Lord Slynn and Lord Hope adopted a considerably more 
conservative approach both in their construction of the authorities and in their statutory inter-
pretation. With regard to the former they employed a much more restrictive interpretation than 
did the majority. Both held that the authorities clearly supported the proposition that the public's 
right to use the highway was limited to passage and repassage and anything incidental or ancil-
lary to that right. The test of what was "ordinary and reasonable" user of the highway was not 
to be applied in the abstract but rather in the context of the exercise of the right of passage, 
which was the only right which members of the public were entitled to exercise when "using 
the highway as a highway".22 
Perhaps more interesting is the fact that it was only the dissenting judges who actually consid-
ered the intention of Parliament in passing section 70 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order 
Act in the first place. In passing this section Parliament deliberately imported the private law 
device of trespass into the public law sphere. As Lord Hope stated, "section 14...brings into the 
arena of the criminal law the rights if any which the public have as against the occupier of the 
land in private law".23 Parliament may have chosen to take out of the hands of the occupier the 
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right to complain of a trespass and place it at the disposal of the police (which thus gives it a 
public law dimension in that it concerns the relationship between the citizen and the state) but 
nevertheless the extent of these limits must be found in the relationship in private law between 
the public and the occupier - this is what Parliament clearly intended.24 If the approach of the 
majority were to be adopted, argued Lord Hope, this would result in a "fundamental rearrange-
ment of the respective rights of the public and of those of public and private landowners" and 
this in a situation in which no landowner was present to defend their interests.25 
Also with regard to the intention of Parliament Lord Slynn commented that but for the section 
in question no action would have been taken against a peaceful, non-obstructive assembly like 
the one the appellants took part in. Parliament did not pass the section for nothing: 
Parliament in 1994 has enabled action over and above existing remedies to deal with trespass 
on the highway...to be taken to deal with what was seen as a growing problem. If Parliament 
wants to take away that form of control, it can obviously do so. I do not consider that disap-
proval of this power justifies a change in the law as to the public's rights over the highway, 
which is what at times seems to be one of the bases of the defendants' arguments, [emphasis 
added]26 
As regards the "lack of symmetry" argument, Lord Hope considered that "like it or not" the 
intention of Parliament as disclosed by the language used in the section made this inevitable.27 
C O M M E N T 
Of the majority, only Lord Irvine placed any reliance on the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 11(1) of which guarantees the right to freedom of 
assembly subject to the exceptions listed in paragraph 2. He considered that unless the common 
law recognised that assembly on the public highway may be lawful then the Article 11(1) right 
would be denied. He stressed that mere toleration of assemblies on the highway does not secure 
a fundamental right to hold them. Lord Slynn and Lord Hope, finding neither the common law 
uncertain nor the Statute ambiguous, did not feel the need to resort to the Convention. 
Notwithstanding this reluctance to place reliance on it however, it is tempting to see the 
Convention as forming a heavy backdrop to the decision in this case, especially given the recent 
passage of the Human Rights Act 1998. It is at least arguable that the interpretation of section 
14A by the Divisional Court would have been in breach of Article 11 in that it failed to have 
sufficient regard to the principle of proportionality.28 Perhaps it was the imminence of incor-
poration that, in part and obliquely, fuelled the reasoning of the majority. There are certainly 
hints in their speeches that indicate that this was the case. The very recognition of a common 
law right of public assembly is in itself a major departure from the traditional Diceyan posi-
tion that there exist only residual liberties as opposed to positive rights in the U K . Also their 
Lordships were willing to stretch their construction of the authorities (resulting in a progres-
sive interpretation of the Act which was probably not intended by the Parliament of 1994) in 
a way which is reminiscent of the dynamic method of interpretation employed by the European 
Convention organs.29 There is also evidence of a willingness to look outside the U K for guid-
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ance on human rights issues. Lord Hutton derived support for his argument that the common 
law recognises the right of public assembly from the judgement of Lamer C.J.C. in Committee 
for the Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada.30 In contrast the minority appeared reluctant to 
see this as a human rights case at all but rather as one which, due to the intention of Parliament 
as evidenced by the language it used, had to be answered by applying the principles of the "law 
of real property and land-ownership".31 
It could be argued that the 1994 Parliament's use of the private law device of trespass in 
the realm of public law to control the exercise of a fundamental right was always going to 
be problematic. The nature of these problems has been examined by Kevin Gray who has 
persuasively argued that there necessarily exist moral limitations on private property rights, 
especially where such property is given over to public use as, for example, in the case of the 
highway. Gray argues that the very notion of property has a moral component, and private 
property rights should not necessarily be allowed to trump or override basic rights such as 
freedom of speech or assembly.32 It may be possible to read DPP v. Jones as an example of 
this kind of limitation exercise. 
On a more practical level it would seem that the decision in DPP v. Jones will result in the 
public being able to participate in a whole range of activities on the highway as long as they 
are reasonable and do not interfere with the primary purpose of passage. The question of what 
constitutes reasonable user will itself no doubt cause much confusion. How for example will 
the police officer on the scene of a demonstration on the highway where a section 14A order 
is in place be able to judge whether or not it is a reasonable user? However, despite the antic-
ipated difficulties, it is submitted that the progressive and bold approach of the majority of the 
House of Lords is to be applauded and reflects an increasing awareness of the importance of 
positive human rights amongst the higher judiciary prior to the coming into force of the Human 
Rights Act 1998. 
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